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1 Introduction
Flexible working arrangements concede employees with some degree of control over when
and where they choose to work. Essentially, one can distinguish between three types of working
flexibility: contractual, spatial and temporal. Following Yu and Postepska (2020), (i) contractual
flexibility allows for a reduction in working hours, i.e., part-time work; (ii) spatial flexibility
allows the employee to decide its main place of work; and (iii) temporal flexibility (also called
flexitime or flexible working hours) gives the employee the possibility to choose the start and end
times of her daily workday. This study focuses on temporal flexibility.
It has been argued in literature that flexible time arrangements allow for a better work-life bal-
ance (Russell et al., 2009; Skinner and Pocock, 2011) and decreased motherhood and gender wage
gaps (Chung and Van der Horst, 2018; Fuller and Hirsh, 2019). Working flexibility is especially
important to women as, besides the increasing female labour market participation rates, women
still dedicate significantly more time than men to child-rearing and housework (Eurofound, 2016).
In Portugal, according to Eurofound (2016), 36% of Portuguese employees find it difficult to
combine paid work with family needs. The first Labour Code (2003) gave employees with care re-
sponsibilities the right to request part-time or flexible working hours, aiming to provide them with
a better work-life balance. However, this is still not a common practice in Portugal. According to
Eurofound (2017), Portugal was among the four least flexible countries in the European Union in
2015, with less than 20% of all Portuguese employees (independently of caring responsibilities)
having some degree of schedule control, compared to 30% for the EU. Furthermore, women have
less flexible schedules than men. Only in 3 EU countries (out of the 28) women registered higher
levels of working time flexibility (Plantenga and Remery, 2010).
In this study, we use employee level data, combined with our own litigation database, aiming
to examine the existence of gender heterogeneity in the use and access to flexible working hours
in the Portuguese labour market. The contributions of this study to the literature are twofold:
(i) the use of a new data set covering all employees working with and without time flexibility in
Portugal, provided by the Ministry of Labour, which allowed us to study gender heterogeneity
and the importance of collective bargaining power in fostering female access to flexible working
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hours; and (ii) the use of our own collected and coded data on the refusals to requests for flexitime,
which proved that women request flexible arrangements and those are denied to them. Our results
suggest a persistent gender heterogeneity in the use and access to flexible hours, where women
have a lower probability of having a flexible schedule, even tough female workers are the ones
requesting flexibility the most. In female dominated sectors (health and social care and educa-
tion), the magnitude of the estimates is even stronger. Our results are robust to a set of different
specifications and models. Furthermore, we provide evidence of the positive impact of collective
bargaining power in increasing working time flexibility for female workers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review.
Section 3 sets the contextual background of flexible working arrangements and collective bargain-
ing in Portugal. Section 4 describes the various data sets we use in this study. Section 5 explains
our methodology. Section 6 presents and discusses the results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
Flexible working time arrangements are a growing topic in research. With the increasing rates
of female labour market participation and the perpetuation of the female role in assuming caring
responsibilities, the study of working flexibility has been focusing on its potential to narrow the
gender gap and improve workers’ work-life balance.
Exploiting household data from the United Kingdom, Chung and Van der Horst (2018) con-
clude that women who use flexitime have a lower probability of reducing their working hours.
The reduction of hours is a common practise among working mothers, which penalizes them both
through decreased paid working hours and increased penalty in career progression. Fuller and
Hirsh (2019) show that this effect of flexitime in narrowing the motherhood wage gap is more
intense to women with higher levels of education.
Research has further exploited the trade-off between higher pay and higher flexibility. Goldin
(2014) argues that women self-select into lower pay jobs, foregoing a higher wage to access flex-
ible schedules, as employers tend to reward longer and atypical hours. On the other hand, Chung
(2019) finds that female dominated workplaces have simultaneously lower wages and lower ac-
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cess to flexible working arrangements, possibly explained by the employer’s difficulty to handle
an overload of requests. Additionally, Hensvik et al. (2020) show that women tend to sort into
non-unique jobs after the birth of the first child (i.e., jobs where there are close substitutes to
the absent worker), where flexibility is easier to accommodate. Non-unique jobs perpetuate the
gender gap, as they are associated with a lower wage, worst career progression and less stable
employment.
Flexible working arrangements have further been associated with a better work-life balance
(Russell et al., 2009; Hayman, 2009; Skinner and Pocock, 2011), improved mental health and
well-being (Yu and Postepska, 2020), and reduced levels of distress and work pressure for em-
ployees (Kandolin et al., 2001).
Apart from its benefits, Golden (2001) shows that not all workers have the same access to
flexible working hours. Workers with managerial, professional, technical and sales occupations;
and with individual characteristics such as being white, male, married, self-employed and higher
educated are more likely to use flexitime. According to Golden (2001) being a woman reduces
the probability of having a flexible schedule by 10%.
Literature portrays a general consensus on the role of unions in narrowing the gender gap
(Elvira and Saporta, 2001; Kahn, 2015), as they tend to follow an egalitarian policy (Cardoso and
Portugal, 2005). Their impact in fostering working flexibility, however, is not standard across
countries. While Budd and Mumford (2004) find a negative association between unions and the
availability of flexible working arrangements, Gregory and Milner (2009) argue that collective
bargaining fosters its implementation. In Portugal, the two major trade unions have divergent
opinions on flexibility (Keune, 2006). On the employer side, Cardoso and Portugal (2005) argues
that a higher coordination of employers decreases the bargaining power of unions, leading to lower
bargained wages and working conditions; with Rigby and O’Brien-Smith (2010) further showing
that increasing working flexibility is not a priority for employers.
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3 Flexible working arrangements and collective bargaining
3.1 Flexible working arrangements
In Portugal, since 1984 that the law concedes employees with care responsibilities the right
to request flexible working arrangements, “under conditions to be regulated”. Nonetheless, only
with the first Labour Code (approved in 2003), which was later revised (Law no. 7/2009, from
12th February), the conditions on which this right could be exercised were established.
Aiming to provide all employees with care responsibilities a better work-life balance, the new
Labour Code concedes workers with children who are under 12 or, regardless of age, disabled
or chronically ill, the right to work under flexible working hours. The worker can choose the
start and end times of the normal daily work period, as well as the compulsory weekly rest day.
Furthermore, the employee has the right to work in part-time, which should correspond to half of
the full-time working hours. The employer may only refuse such requests on business grounds or
hard-to-fill vacancy. If the employer wishes to refuse the request, she must request the bidding
prior legal opinion of the Portuguese Commission for Equality at Work and Employment (hence-
forward CEWE), who may then decide against or in favour of the employee’s request. Breaching
this duty represents a serious offense. All refused requests for flexible hours or part-time are
publicly available on CEWE’s website.
3.2 Collective bargaining
In Portugal, the law establishes three types of agreements that allow for collective bargain-
ing of wage settings and other working conditions, mainly the working time. These collective
agreements may be applicable to entire industries or occupations, and are bargained between em-
ployers and unions. Following Addison et al. (2017), the three types of collective agreements
in Portugal are: (i) Contratos Coletivos de Tarbalho (CCT), sectoral level agreements; (ii) Acor-
dos Coletivos de Trabalho (ACT), multi-firm agreements; and (iii) Acordos de Empresa (AE),
single-firm agreements. The CCTs predominate and consist in negotiations between, at least, one
employer’s association and one union. The ACTs are signed between a group of employers and
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the AEs are negotiated by one individual firm. It is not rare for employers to voluntarily extend
these agreements to all workers at their firm, or for the Ministry of Labour to extend collective
agreements to entire industries (especially CCTs), when requested by the employer and the union
(in the latter case, called Portarias de Extensão, PE). According to Addison et al. (2017), around
70% to 80% of the workforce is covered by some type of collective agreement without belonging
to the organisation who signed it. This explains the high percentage of workers covered by col-
lective agreements, as only 10% of the private sector workers in Portugal are unionised (Portugal
and Vilares, 2013). Finally, as a last resource and in the absence of a collective agreement or
an extension, the Ministry of Labour may issue an Ordinance of Working Conditions (Portarias
de Condição de Trabalho, PCT) to regulate the sector. Both PEs and PCTs are non-bargainable
collective agreements.
4 Data
This study uses three different sources of data: (i) Quadros de Pessoal, (ii) the Labour Force
Survey and (iii) the refusals of requests for flexible working arrangements sent to the Portuguese
Commission for Equality at Work and Employment. Table 1 provides a short description of each
database. A detailed description follows in the next subsections.
Table 1: Description of data sets used
Data set Year Obs Type Obtained from
Quadros de Pessoal 2013 - 2018 16M* Linked employee-employer data GEP/MTSSS
Labour Force Survey 2019 13.064 Household survey Statistics Portugal
CEWE 2019 601 Individual litigation Coded by author
*Note: M stands for 1 million
4.1 Labour Force Survey
We use data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and its Ad-Hoc Module on working time
organization from 2019, provided by Statistics Portugal. The LFS is conducted on a quarterly
basis to a representative sample of households. The ad-hoc survey was conducted in the second
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trimester of 2019 to individuals who were part of the labour force and were older than or at least
15 years old at the time of the survey. We restricted our sample to employees, excluding the self-
employed (which implied the exclusion of 3 115 observations). Our final sample includes 13 064
individuals observations.
Table 2 (panel A) portrays descriptive statistics of the Labour Force Survey. Our dependent
variable is a flexible working hours indicator, defined as the type of working time organization
where the worker has the power to define the start and end times of her daily workday, according
to her interest, with or without restrictions.
4.2 Quadros de Pessoal
Quadros de Pessoal (QP) is a longitudinal linked employer-employee database. The information
is collected through an annual compulsory survey made to all establishments operating in Portugal
and with at least one wage earner. It contains information of the employer, both at the firm and
establishment level, and of the employee.1 The fact that QP is a compulsory survey reduces the
probability of attrition bias. For this study, we use QP from 2013 until 2018 (latest available),
provided physical at the safe center of the Ministry of Labour (GEP/MTSSS)2. As we further
study the role of collective bargaining, we follow Addison et al. (2017) and limit our analysis
to full-time workers, and exclude the agriculture sector. Our final sample contains 16 million
observations.
Table 2 (panel B) provides descriptive statistics of employee-level variables. Our dependent
variable is a flexible working hours indicator. In Quadros de Pessoal, flexible hours is defined as
the type of working time organization where the worker can choose the start and end times of her
daily work period according to her interest, with restrictions. This definition is more restrictive
than the one used in the LFS and thus captures a lower share of workers.
1Quadros de Pessoal does not include information on civil servants nor on independent workers.
2The fact that we only had access to this data in December and the many constraints caused by the pandemic and
holiday period, limited our ability to deepen some parts of the empirical analysis.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of Labour Force Survey and Quadros de Pessoal
Panel (A) Panel (B)
Labour Force Survey 2019 Quadros de Pessoal 2013-2018
————————————— —————————————
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs*
Female 0.525 0.499 0 1 13,064 0.480 0.500 0 1 16M
Flexible hours 0.200 0.400 0 1 13,064 0.041 0.200 0 1 16M
Aged less than 35 0.220 0.414 0 1 13,064 0.334 0.472 0 1 16M
Children aged less than 12 0.262 0.44 0 1 13,064 -
Monthly wage 891.796 518.581 12 15000 13,064 889.0 1054.8 6.35 654166 16M
Tenure 12.506 11.532 0 68 13,064 7.656 8.838 0 66 16M
Type of contract
Permanent 0.795 0.403 0 1 13,064 0.674 0.469 0 1 16M
Fixed-term 0.173 0.378 0 1 13,064 0.251 0.434 0 1 16M
Uncertain-term - 0.068 0.251 0 1 16M
Other situation 0.032 0.175 0 1 13,064 0.007 0.084 0 1 16M
Type of collective agreement
Multi-firm: Acordo Coletivo de Trabalho - 0.038 0.192 0 1 16M
Single-firm: Acordo de empresa - 0.033 0.179 0 1 16M
Sectoral: Contrato Coletivo de Trabalho - 0.727 0.445 0 1 16M
Portaria de Condição de Trabalho - 0.047 0.212 0 1 16M
Portaria de Extensão - 0.032 0.175 0 1 16M
Not covered by any of the above - 0.122 0.328 0 1 16M
Note: Data from panel (A) was obtained from the Labour Force Survey of 2019, provided by Statistics Portugal. In the LFS, ”flexible hours”
is defined as the type of working time organization where the worker has the power to define the start and end times of her daily workday, with
or without restrictions. Panel (B) uses data from Quadros de Pessoal, provided by GEP/MTSSS. The variable ”flexible hours” is defined as the
type of working time organization where the worker can choose the start and end times of her daily work period according to her interest, with
restrictions.
*M stands for 1 million
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According to this data, between 2013 and 2018, an average of 4.1% of employees used flex-
itime.3 These different definitions allow us to confirm the robustness of ours results.
Table 3: Collective agreements by gender and sector (%)
All sectors Health and social care Education
———————— ———————— ————————
Collective agreement Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total
Multi-firm: ACT 4.41 2.76 3.56 14.98 12.23 14.60 1.80 0.20 1.40
Single-firm: AE 2.41 3.88 3.17 3.02 5.75 3.40 0.48 0.65 0.52
Sectoral: CCT 64.59 67.87 66.30 39.99 32.20 38.91 53.22 45.31 51.20
PCT 0.89 0.61 0.74 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.64 0.68 0.65
PE 2.10 4.13 3.16 0.32 1.46 0.48 0.12 0.36 0.18
Not covered 25.60 20.75 23.08 41.17 47.87 42.09 43.74 52.81 46.06
Note: Data was collected from Quadros de Pessoal, covering the period from 2013 to 2018.
Table 4: Flexible schedules per type of collective agreements (%)
All sectors Health and social care Education
———————— ———————— ————————
Collective agreement Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total
Multi-firm: ACT 6.22 10.88 7.92 4.40 8.30 4.85 1.41 0.59 1.38
Single-firm: AE 15.80 8.19 10.89 5.04 6.83 5.45 27.90 43.97 32.76
Sectoral: CCT 3.70 3.69 3.70 4.86 7.54 5.17 2.26 5.12 3.18
PCT 3.73 4.75 4.16 4.25 6.75 4.57 6.91 6.75 6.87
PE 5.97 4.52 4.95 5.89 9.53 7.40 6.27 7.69 6.98
Not covered 3.89 4.09 3.98 4.40 5.70 4.60 3.89 4.50 4.07
Note: Data was collected from Quadros de Pessoal, covering the period from 2013 to 2018.
Table 3 portrays the share of collective agreements by gender. We provide detailed statistics
for the health and social care and education sectors as we will focus our analysis in these two
industries in Section 6. Sectoral agreements predominate. Women appear to have a higher cov-
erage of multi-firm and sectoral agreements, while men have a higher coverage of lower-scale
agreements (single-firm). The health and social care sector stands out for its different distribu-
tion of agreements: multi-firm agreements have a higher weight than the average, while sectoral
agreements are less present. Table 4 shows statistics of the percentage of workers with flexitime in
each type of collective agreement. The smallest-scale, single-firm and multi-firm, are the types of
3Both the Portuguese LFS and European statistics on flexible working arrangements are collected by asking
households to rate their degree of power in deciding their daily work schedule. With the LFS, we considered that an
individual had a flexible schedule if she argues to be able to define the start and end times of her daily workday, with
or without restrictions. Our obtained statistic for flexible working hours is similar to the one from Eurofound (2017).
On the other hand, the information from QP is filled by the employers, who decide whether the contract with their
employees involves a flexible schedule. This latter definition captures a lower share of workers.
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agreement with more flexible working. Further statistics on the distribution of flexible schedules,
female workers and collective agreements per sector can be found in Figure A.1..
4.3 Commission for Equality at Work and Employment
As mentioned in Section 3, all workers with care responsibilities have the right to request flexi-
ble working hours and part-time work in Portugal, which can only be refused by the employer with
CEWE’s permission. All refused requests are publicly available on CEWE’s website.4 Hence, al-
though we do not have access to the universe of requests (both accepted and refused), we do have
access to all requests refused by employers since 2005 until 2019.
We created our own litigation database by collecting and coding these refusals. We started by
downloading 612 documents containing the request of the worker and refusal of the employer, in
PDF format, with an average of 15 pages each. From these initial requests, we excluded 4 where
CEWE had not issued an opinion, and 7 where the same worker requested the arrangement twice.5
Our final database is composed by 601 refusals.
We manually coded the following variables: type of request (flexible hours or part-time),
whether CEWE accepted the request of the employee (i.e., denied the refusal of the employer);
sector of activity (following the Portuguese CAE-Rev.3 division6); occupation (following the Por-
tuguese Classification of Occupations); gender; and number of children younger than 12 years
old. Table 5 portrays descriptive statistics. It is important to notice that when CEWE publishes
the refusals of requests, personal information is erased for anonymity reasons, which, sometimes,
prevented us from identifying all needed information.
The overwhelming majority of the requests (82.3%) were made by female workers. The re-
fused requests came predominately from the health and social care sector (46.5%), and from the
service and sales occupation. Most workers request flexible working hours (92.8%) instead of
part-time work. The large majority of the requests are accepted by CEWE (75.5%), meaning
4These documents can be found here: cite.gov.pt/pt/acite/pareceres.html
5Being the first refused by CEWE due to the request being done incorrectly, and the second accepted; we have
decided to exclude the second observation, i.e. the acceptance, for a matter of fairness, since there might be more
workers who saw their request refused for being done incorrectly and who will made a new one, that might be
accepted, but that will only be published by CEWE in 2020.
6Portuguese Classification of Economic Activities, third revision, elaborated by Statistics Portugal.
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the employer is obligated by law to accept the worker’s request. Moreover, from these non-
acceptances, 92% saw that outcome due to an incorrect request (for instance, missing informa-
tion), in which case the worker may reformulate a new request, that will be accepted by CEWE.
This latter result further reinforces that CEWE considers that most employers have enough condi-
tions to grant flexible arrangements, although their refuse their worker’s request.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of refusals to requests for flexible working arrangements
Variables Obs Proportion* Proportion (female)**
Female 601 82.33%
Type of request 601
Flexible hours 92.68% 82.37%
Part-time 7.32% 81.82%
Accepted in favor of the employee 601 75.5%
Sector of activity 601
Agriculture 0.18% 100%
Manufacturing 6.74% 78.38%
Waste Management 0.36% 0.00%
Retail 20.22% 94.59%
Transportation 7.10% 28.21%
Accommodation and Food Services 5.83% 87.50%
Financial and Insurance 0.91% 80.00%
Professional Activities 1.64% 66.67%
Administrative Activities 7.65% 54.76%
Public Administration 1.09% 16.67%
Education 0.73% 50.00%
Health and Social Care 46.45% 94.07%
Arts, Entertainment 0.36% 0.00%





Clerical support workers 13.35% 61.19 %
Service and sales 43.43% 88.48%
Craft workers 1.59% 37.50%
Machine operators 2.19% 54.55%
Elementary occupations 5.98 100%
Note: Data was collected and coded by the author through the reading of all PDF docu-
ments of refusals to requests for flexible working arrangements, sent to the Commission
for Equality at Work and Employment, and published in their website in 2019.
*Percentage of refused requests per sector.
*Percentage of women who’s request was refused, per sector.
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Figure 1 - panel a) - portrays the weight of refusals to requests for flexible working arrange-
ments on each industry. These weights are framed into a sectoral characterization, with shares of
flexible schedules and female workers. The health and social care has the highest percentage of
females and a large proportion of workers with flexitime (above average). In panel b) we see that
this industry registers the highest ratio of refused requests to females over female workers (0.1%).
These facts suggest that the high share of refused requests to female workers in this sector is not
a consequence of the female dominance, but could evidence an inaccessibility to flexible working
arrangements for female workers. The inaccessibility to flexitime in female dominated industries
is discussed in Chung (2019), however, it should apply to both genders. In Section 6 we focus our
analysis on this industry to examine possible gender heterogeneity in the most female dominated
industry, and where flexible working hours appear to be difficult to obtain for women. Moreover,
we will focus the analysis on the education sector as this is the second most female dominated
industry and shares a relatively high level of flexibility as well. Nonetheless, it has the lowest
ratio in panel b), which provides us with two different perspectives on female access to flexitime
in female dominates industries.
Figure 1: Statistics for refusals for flexitime; share of females and flexibility per sector
(a) Weight of refusals; share of females and flexibility (b) Ratio of female refusals over female workers
Note: Data for percentage of flexible schedules and female workers per sector was obtained from Quadros de Pessoal,
covering the period from 2013 to 2018. Data for the refusals to requests for flexible working arrangements was
collected by the author. The size of the circles in panel a) represent the weight of refused requests per sector.
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5 Methodology
The Labour Force Survey is a cross-section where our dependent variable, flexible working
hours, is binary. Hence, we used a Linear Probability Model (LPM), following equation (1).
flexible hoursi = γfemalei +X
′
iβ + εi (1)
Our outcome variable takes value 1 if the employee has a flexible schedule. Our explanatory
variable is a female indicator. X ′i includes the set of controls: being aged less than 35 years
old, having children under 12 years old, occupation, educational level, logarithm of wage, type
of contract, sector of activity, tenure at and dimension of the firm. Standard errors are robust to
prevent heteroskedasticity.
Quadros de Pessoal is a longitudinal data set. For this study, we use information at the es-
tablishment and employee levels, covering the period from 2013 to 2018. We start by estimating
equation (2) with a Pooled OLS model.
flexible hoursift = γfemalei +X
′
iftβ + δtyeart + af + εift (2)
In equation (2), our binary outcome variable is a flexible hours indicator from employee i,
working at establishment f in year t. Our explanatory variable is a female indicator. X ′ift is a set of
time-variant controls: being aged less than 35 years old, occupation, educational level, logarithm
of wage, type of contract, indicator for collective labour agreements, sector of activity, tenure at
and dimension of the firm. yeart is an year dummy, to account for time-specific fixed effects and
εift is the error term. Finally, af is the establishment fixed effect, capturing the time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity, i.e., time-invariant unobserved effects that vary across establishments,
such as managerial practices or aspects of the production function that may foster or limit the use
of flexible working arrangements.
With Pooled OLS, the term (af + εift) is part of the error. To be able to control for the
unobserved heterogeneity (af ), we re-estimate equation (2) with establishment-level Fixed Effects
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(FE).7 Both with Pooled OLS and FE we use robust standard errors, clustered at the establishment
level, to account for heteroskedasticity and correlation in establishment errors.
6 Discussion of results
We divide our analysis in three parts: (i) use of flexitime in the Portuguese labour market; (ii)
use versus access to flexible working hours; and (iii) flexitime in female dominated industries.
6.1 Gender heterogeneity in the use of flexible working hours
To examine the possible existence of gender heterogeneity in the use of flexible working hours
in the Portuguese labour market, we start by estimating equation (1) using a LPM with the LFS
cross-section data. Table 6 portrays the results of this specification.
In column (1) from Table 6, the estimate of the coefficient of the female indicator suggests that
being a woman will reduce the probability of using flexitime by 5.1 percentage points (p.p.). Com-
pared with the total percentage of employees with flexible working hours, this estimate represents
a 26% decrease in the probability of using flexitime. One possible explanation for this substantial
gender heterogeneity is that men may be self-selecting into sectors or occupations that are able to
provide more flexible working arrangements than others, due to their production characteristics.
This sorting could bias our conclusions, as the heterogeneity could be explained by self-selection
and not by the gender itself. To control for this possible sorting, in the remaining columns of Table
6 we control for individual and sector level variables. In all specifications, the estimates of the
coefficients of the female indicators are robust to the added covariates, indicating a significant and
negative correlation between being a woman and having flexitime, between 3.4p.p. and 6.5p.p..
These results suggest that, even working in the same sector and sharing the same occupation or
educational level, women are between 17% to 32.5% less likely to use flexible working hours
than men. Moreover, having a higher wage seems to increase the use of flexible working hours.
Being aged less than 35 years old (which is an age interval when it is common for mothers to have
7Fixed effects are at the establishment-level so that we do not loose individual time-constant variables, such as
gender, since this is our explanatory variable.
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Table 6: Regression results for the Labour Force Survey
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.051*** -0.065*** -0.049*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.034***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Aged less than 35 years old -0.042*** -0.077*** -0.048*** -0.026** -0.040*** -0.037***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Children aged less than 12 0.032*** 0.012 0.011 0.015 0.010 0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Dimension of workplace -0.007 -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Education
Middle education 0.070*** 0.016 0.008 0.003 0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Higher education 0.265*** 0.087*** 0.074*** 0.063*** 0.062***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)









Occupation dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,138 10,138 10,138 10,138 10,138 10,138
R2 0.059 0.111 0.156 0.159 0.161 0.165
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Data from columns (1) to (6) was obtained from the Labour Force Survey of 2019, provided by Statistics
Portugal. The indicator variable ”flexible hours” is defined as the type of working time organization where the
worker has the power to define the start and end times of her daily workday, with or without restrictions. All
specifications were calculated with a linear probability model.
For education the base category is elementary education and for type of contract is independent contract.
the first child (Eurostat, 2018) and, consequently, have the right to work with time flexibility),
decreases the probability of using flexible schedules. Lastly, having children under 12 seems to
have no effect on this probability.
To check the robustness of our estimates and study collective bargaining power, we further
estimate equation (2) using both a Pooled OLS and FE models with Quadros de Pessoal longitu-
dinal data, where a different definition of flexible working hours is used (see Section 4). Table 7
provides the estimates. The first column of Table 7 uses a Pooled OLS estimation model, where,
besides the negative sign, being a female worker does not seem to have a significant effect on the
probability of having flexible working time arrangements. The remaining columns of the Table
use establishment fixed effects, as establishments may embody unobserved characteristics that
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Table 7: Regression results for Quadros de Pessoal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.002 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Aged less than 35 years old -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Log dimension of establishment 0.003* 0.002** 0.003** 0.003** 0.008* 0.008*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Log wage -0.005* -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.046*** -0.047***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Log tenure -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Type of contract
Permanent -0.009 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.032*** -0.032***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009)
Fixed-term -0.012 -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.034*** -0.034***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009)
Uncertain-term -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.025** -0.025**
(0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011)
Collective agreements
Multi-firm: ACT 0.073** 0.068** 0.185*** 0.180***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.061) (0.061)
Single-firm: AE -0.000 -0.025 -0.013 -0.048*
(0.011) (0.017) (0.023) (0.028)
Sectoral: CCT -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
PCT -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.010
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008)
PE 0.003 0.005** 0.012 0.019**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008)
Female × Collective agreements
Female × Multi-firm: ACT 0.010*** 0.009*
(0.003) (0.005)
Female × Single-firm: AE 0.059*** 0.101***
(0.019) (0.024)
Female × Sectoral: CCT -0.002 -0.010***
(0.001) (0.003)
Female × PCT -0.003* -0.019***
(0.002) (0.007)
Female × PE -0.004** -0.020***
(0.002) (0.007)
Establishment fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education level dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only % flexible schedules > 0 No No No No Yes Yes
Observations* 10M 10M 10M 10M 2,978m 2,978m
R2 0.026 0.593 0.594 0.594 0.553 0.554
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Data from columns (1) to (6) was obtained from Quadros de Pessoal, from 2013 to 2018, provided by
GEP/MTSSS. The indicator variable ”flexible hours” is defined as the type of working time organization where
the worker can choose the start and end times of her daily work period according to her interest, with restrictions.
Column (1) was calculated using a Pooled OLS model and columns (2) to (6) using fixed effects at the establishment
level. Columns (1) to (4) include all establishments and columns (5) and (6) are restricted to establishments with at
least one employee with flexible working hours. For type of contract the base category is other type of contract, and
for collective agreement is not covered by any collective agreement.
*M stands for million, m stands for thousand
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determine the granting of flexible schedules. Controlling for these unobservables, column (2)
suggests that being a woman will decrease the probability of having a flexible schedule by 0.3p.p..
Column (3) adds indicators for type of collective agreements (both bargainable and non-
bargainable). The coefficient of the female indicator maintains the same magnitude: female
workers are 7.3% less likely than males of using flexitime, out of the total probability of hav-
ing a flexible schedule. Our results are in line with Golden (2001), who finds a 10% decreased
probability of using flexible working hours for female workers. The estimates in column (3) fur-
ther indicate that workers covered by a multi-firm contract are 7.3p.p. more likely to use flexible
working hours than workers not covered by any collective agreement.
Column (4) interacts each collective agreement with the female indicator. Results suggest
that a woman covered by a multi-firm agreement has an increased probability of 7.4p.p. of us-
ing flexitime, compared to an increased 6.8p.p. for a man. The same positive relation is verified
for single-firm agreements: women with single-firm agreements have an increased probability of
3p.p. of having a flexible schedule, while men with the same agreement face a reduced probabil-
ity of 2.5p.p.. On the other hand, with the non-bargainable agreements, we see a reversed image:
a woman covered by an Ordinance of Working Conditions (PCT) or by an extension (PE) faces
a reduced probability (-0.6p.p. and -0.3p.p.), while a man faces an increased probability of us-
ing flexible working hours (0.1p.p. and 0.5p.p., respectively). This finding suggests that, while
smaller-scale collective bargaining (multi-firm and single-firm levels) is able to reduce the gender
heterogeneity by favouring women, non-bargainable agreements perpetuate the inaccessibility of
women to flexible working time arrangements.
In the last two columns of Table 7, we restrict the analysis to establishments where there is
at least one employee with a flexible schedule. The rational behind this modification is that an
establishment may not be able to provide flexible working arrangements to any worker. However,
if we look inside establishments where at least one flexible schedule exists, then the establishment
has the capacity to provide flexible time arrangements. Using this modification, the estimates
for female persist negative and significant: a female worker at a establishment with at least one
flexible schedule is 4%8 less likely to use flexitime than a male working at the same establishment.
8Out of the 20% workers with flexible schedules at establishments that provide for some flexitime possibilities.
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Our results suggest that within establishments able to provide flexible schedules, women still have
a lower probability of having one.
Furthermore, the conclusions for the interactions between female and collective agreements
apply: smaller-scale collective bargainable agreements favour female access to flexitime, while
non-bargainable agreements favour men. Column (6) further indicates that higher-scale bargain-
able agreements worsen female working flexibility: a woman covered by a sectoral agreement is
1.4p.p. less likely of using flexitime, while a man experiences an increased probability of 0.5p.p..
Since the majority of PEs are extensions of sectoral agreements, and that ordinances (PCTs) cover
entire sectors, it was expected that sectoral agreements, extensions and ordinances had the same
effect. Moreover, the evidence that single-firm and multi-firm agreements provide women with
a higher access to flexible working arrangements is in line with Cardoso and Portugal (2005), as
unions tend to follow an egalitarian policy and have a higher bargaining power the lower is the
coordination between employers.
Finally, the estimates for type of contract suggest that both permanent and fixed-term contracts
are associated with a lower use of flexitime, and of the same magnitude, when compared to other
types of contracts such as independent ones. Furthermore, the estimate for wage shows the oppo-
site sign as in Table 6. One of the explanations is that the wage coefficient in the LFS regression
is capturing establishment characteristics. It could be that establishments with higher wages also
have more flexitime. In fact, the wage coefficient with no establishment fixed effects in column
(1) of Table 7 is only significant at a 10% level. However, when looking at within variation, the
wage coefficient decreases by 3 times. These results suggest that females are getting the least paid
jobs within establishments that provide for some flexitime possibilities. A further confirmation of
this fact is the coefficient in the regressions with only flexible establishments being even lower.
6.2 Use and access to flexible working arrangements
Our results until now suggest that even controlling for employee and establishment level charac-
teristics and looking inside establishments that are able to provide flexible arrangements, women
are less likely to use flexitime than men. However, this finding does not directly imply a discrimi-
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nation against women. It may be the case that women have access to flexible schedules but simply
do not want to have them. According to Skinner et al. (2016), workers with caring responsibili-
ties (and, in our specific case, women) may be as well unaware of their right to request flexible
working arrangements, warranted by law.
The evidence provided in Section 4.3, with the litigation data we collected, allows to verify
these hypotheses. In 2019, 601 employees requested flexible working arrangements and saw their
request refused by their employer. Moreover, since 2005 (first year with published refusals in
CEWE’s website), the number of refused requests has been increasing at a fast rate (see Figure
A.2.). This first finding goes against the hypothesis that employees are unaware of their right, as,
since 2005, 3865 working parents wanted these time arrangements and were unable to have them,
which represents 3% of the mean percentage of employees with a flexible schedule in 2018.
Our first hypothesis was that women might have access to flexible working arrangements and
simply not wanting them. Once again, this hypothesis fails when we analyse the gender domi-
nance of the refusals: 82.3% of the refusals were to requests made by women. The clear female
dominance in refused requests suggests that women with care responsibilities do feel the need to
adapt their working schedule to their family needs and, thus, request flexitime. However, those
requests are being denied to them. The fact that CEWE accepted 76% of the requests (meaning
the employer is obligated by law to accept the worker’s request), further evidences that employ-
ers have the capacity to provide flexible working arrangements. Therefore, it seems that is not a
question of use, but rather a question of female access to flexible working time arrangements.
6.3 Female dominated sectors
As discussed in Section 4.3, we now focus our analysis in the health and social care and educa-
tion sectors, aiming to study gender heterogeneity in female dominated industries.
Table 8 provides results for the health and social care sector. All columns were estimated using
fixed effects at the establishment level. In columns (1) and (2), results suggest that being a woman
reduces the probability of having flexitime by 0.8p.p. to 0.9p.p.. In terms of total percentage
of workers with flexible schedules in this industry, these estimates represent a 16.5% to 18.6%
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Table 8: Regression results for the Health and Social Care sector, Quadros de Pessoal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.002 -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Aged less than 35 years old -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.028***
Log dimension of establishment 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Log wage 0.019 0.008 0.008 0.026 0.009 0.009
(0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.030) (0.023) (0.023)
Log tenure 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Type of contract
Permanent -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Fixed-term -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Uncertain-term -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Collective agreements
Multi-firm: ACT 0.158** 0.170** 0.191** 0.207**
(0.069) (0.073) (0.080) (0.085)
Single-firm: AE 0.004 0.016 -0.042 -0.011
(0.012) (0.010) (0.045) (0.035)
Sectoral: CCT -0.005 0.003 -0.010 0.009
(0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
PCT -0.008 0.008 -0.028* 0.057*
(0.006) (0.009) (0.017) (0.031)
PE -0.056* -0.031 -0.123*** -0.049
(0.032) (0.028) (0.034) (0.049)
Female × Collective agreements
Female × Multi-firm: ACT -0.015* -0.021*
(0.008) (0.011)
Female × Single-firm: AE -0.017 -0.046**
(0.015) (0.020)
Female × Sectoral: CCT -0.010*** -0.022***
(0.004) (0.006)
Female × PCT -0.019** -0.099***
(0.008) (0.031)
Female × PE -0.036** -0.096**
(0.014) (0.037)
Establishment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education level dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only % flexible schedules > 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations* 1,121m 1,121m 1,121m 572,247 572,247 572,247
R2 0.435 0.440 0.440 0.409 0.416 0.417
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Data from columns (1) to (6) was obtained from Quadros de Pessoal, from 2013 to 2018, provided by
GEP/MTSSS, and is restricted to the health and social care sector. The indicator variable ”flexible hours” is defined
as the type of working time organization where the worker can choose the start and end times of her daily work
period according to her interest, with restrictions. Column (1) to (6) were calculated using fixed effects at the estab-
lishment level. Columns (1) to (3) include all establishments and columns (4) to (6) are restricted to establishments
with at least one employee with flexible working hours. For type of contract the base category is other type of
contract, and for collective agreement is not covered by any collective agreement.
*m stands for thousand
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Table 9: Regression results for the Education sector, Quadros de Pessoal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004* -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.009*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Aged less than 35 years old -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log dimension of establishment -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.020 -0.019 -0.018
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Log wage -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log tenure -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Type of contract
Permanent 0.011* 0.011* 0.010* 0.027 0.027 0.026
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Fixed-term 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.015 0.015 0.014
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
Uncertain-term 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.027 0.027 0.027
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Collective agreements
Multi-firm: ACT -0.018 -0.030 -0.020 -0.042
(0.035) (0.037) (0.045) (0.048)
Single-firm: AE 0.159 0.150 0.196 0.177
(0.132) (0.130) (0.171) (0.166)
Sectoral: CCT 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.010
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008)
PCT 0.008 0.003 0.035 0.026
(0.010) (0.011) (0.036) (0.046)
PE 0.014 0.024 0.062 0.128
(0.027) (0.036) (0.098) (0.131)
Female × Collective agreements
Female × Multi-firm: ACT 0.012** 0.021**
(0.006) (0.010)
Female × Single-firm: AE 0.014 0.028
(0.014) (0.029)
Female × Sectoral: CCT -0.004 -0.010
(0.003) (0.007)
Female × PCT 0.006 0.010
(0.011) (0.046)
Female × PE -0.026 -0.251*
(0.032) (0.143)
Establishment fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education level dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only % flexible schedules > 0 No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 257,291 257,291 257,291 90,681 90,681 90,681
R2 0.549 0.550 0.550 0.526 0.528 0.528
Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Data from columns (1) to (6) was obtained from Quadros de Pessoal, from 2013 to 2018, provided by
GEP/MTSSS, and is restricted to the health and social care sector. The indicator variable ”flexible hours” is defined
as the type of working time organization where the worker can choose the start and end times of her daily work
period according to her interest, with restrictions. Column (1) to (6) were calculated using fixed effects at the estab-
lishment level. Columns (1) to (3) include all establishments and columns (4) to (6) are restricted to establishments
with at least one employee with flexible working hours. For type of contract the base category is other type of
contract, and for collective agreement is not covered by any collective agreement.
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decreased probability for female workers. The magnitude of these estimates is even stronger than
the one in Table 7: within the industry with the largest share of women, relatively high share of
flexible schedules, and with the highest number of refused requests, female workers have an even
lower access to flexitime.
Similarly to Table 7, being covered by a multi-firm collective agreement seems to increase the
probability of using flexitime, by 1.6p.p.. However, the interactions in column (3) show a different
image than Table 7. All interaction estimates suggest that even the smaller-scale bargainable
agreements reduce the probability of having a flexible schedule for a female worker, but increase
that same probability for males (except for extensions, where there is a reduced use of flexitime
to both genders, although still a more intense reduction to women). One possible explanation
for this finding lays on the distribution of type of agreements. According to Table 3, the health
and social care sector has a higher coverage of multi-firm and single-firm agreements than the
average. Looking in detail into these agreements, we notice that 89% of the multi-firm and 42%
of the single-firm agreements in this industry are made by the same employer: Santa Casa da
Misericórdia. Therefore, the negative effect we obtained by interacting collective agreements and
the female indicator could be capturing a substantial part of the negotiations with Santa Casa da
Misericórdia. Thus, our results may be suggesting that this employer in particular is not allowing
for female flexitime in the health and social care sector. This specificity from this industry may
prevent us from straightforwardly conclude that collective bargaining power is being ineffective
in protecting female claims for more working flexibility.
In columns (4) to (6) we perform the robustness check to flexible workplaces, by restricting
the analysis to establishments with at least one employee using flexitime. In columns (4) and (5),
the estimate for female persists negative and significant: even within establishments able to pro-
vide flexible working time arrangements, women are 9.9% to 10.6% less likely of having them.9
Column (6) estimates the interaction between the gender and collective agreement indicators. The
results are consistent with those in column (3): female workers covered by any type of collec-
tive agreement are less likely to use flexitime when compared to male workers with the same
agreement.
9Out of the 14.1% workers with flexible schedules at establishments that provide for some flexitime possibilities.
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These results for the health and social care sector not only support the gender heterogeneity in
use of flexitime found in Section 6.1, as they surpass it. This sector shows to be a particular case of
study: almost half of the refused requests for flexible working arrangements came from workers
of this sector, 94% of which female; it is an industry with a relatively high level of flexitime; it is
a female dominated industry were men are still the ones having more access to flexible schedules;
and even within establishments that are able to provide for some flexitime possibilities, women
are less likely to access them.
We move the analysis to the second female dominated industry. Table 9 provides the estimates
for the education sector and follows the same structure as Table 8. The estimates for the female
coefficient in columns (1) and (2) suggest that female workers from the education sector have a
reduced probability of 0.6p.p. of having a flexible schedule, when compared to men, already con-
trolling for a set of covariates such as occupation and schooling. Comparing to the industry mean,
women are 15.2% less likely than men to use flexitime. Restricting the analysis to establishments
with at least one worker with flexitime - columns (4) and (5) - the probability of using flexible
working hours decreases by 6.1%10 to females. In neither of these columns the coverage by col-
lective agreements seems to have a significant effect on the use of flexible schedules. Columns (3)
and (6) estimate the interaction term, for all establishments and to establishments with at least one
flexible schedule, respectively. Both columns provide similar results: a female worker covered by
a multi-firm agreement has a higher probability than a male of using flexitime, although this prob-
ability is still negative for both. Similarly to Table 7, smaller-scale collective agreements seem to
be more effective in providing equal access to flexible working time arrangements.
Comparing the results for these two female dominates sectors, we draw different conclusions.
In both industries, female workers have a lower access to flexitime than men, however, this gender
heterogeneity has a stronger magnitude in the health and social care sector, even within establish-
ments that are able to provide for some working time flexibility. Secondly, following the evidence
provided in Figure 1 panel b), we further know that the health and social care sector had the high-
est ratio of refused requests to females over female workers, while this ratio was much smaller
to the education industry. Hence, our results suggest that both female dominated industries suffer
10Out of the 21.2% workers with flexible schedules at establishments that provide for some flexitime possibilities.
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from female inaccessibility to flexitime, but this effect is much stronger at the health and social
care sector. Finally, female workers covered by a multi-firm agreement have a higher probability
of using flexitime at the education sector (similarly to Table 7), while for the health and social
care we did not find a positive impact.
7 Conclusions, limitations and further research
This paper uses linked employer-employee administrative data and the Labour Force Survey
to study gender heterogeneity in the provision of flexible working hours in the Portuguese labour
market.
Using two different data sets with two distinct definitions of working time flexibility, our
results indicate a persistent gender heterogeneity in the grating of flexitime. More precisely, being
a female reduces the probability of having a flexible schedule by 5.2%11 to 7.3%, depending on
the definition used. Our estimates are robust to a set of covariates and different specifications.
Even within establishments able to provide flexible working time arrangements or within female
dominated industries, women have significantly lower access to flexitime than men. We study the
particular cases of the education and health and social care sectors, the two most female dominated
industries, where females are 15.2% to 16.5% less likely than males to use flexitime, respectively.
Our study further exploits the law, which concedes all employees with caring responsibilities
the right to request flexible working hours. We created our own litigation database by collecting
and coding information, to show that female workers do need and do request flexible arrange-
ments, but those requests are being denied to them. Our litigation data suggests that the reduced
female use of flexitime represents a problem of female access to working flexibility.
Furthermore, this paper examines the influence of collective bargaining power in fostering fe-
male access to flexible working arrangements. Our results suggest that female workers covered by
multi-firm or single-firm agreements have a higher probability of having a flexible schedule than
male workers (7.4p.p. and 3p.p. for women against 6.8p.p. and -2.5p.p. for men, respectively).
11Female estimate from Labour Force Survey. The value was normalize for the mean of workers with flexible
schedules according to Quadros de Pessoal (4.1%) to be comparable.
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This finding supports the important role of collective bargaining in protecting female rights, as it
has been defended for the gender wage gap (Elvira and Saporta, 2001; Kahn, 2015). Nonetheless,
in the health and social care sector - the female dominated industry where female workers are the
less likely to use flextime - we did not find a positive influence of collective bargaining power in
fostering female access to flexible working arrangements.
Although we do find convincing evidence of gender heterogeneity in the use and access to
flexible working hours, we are not able to control for unobserved employee fixed effects, as our
variable of interest (female) is time-invariant. Controlling for unobserved employee heterogene-
ity, such as individual bargaining power, would prevent us from potential bias. To address this
caveat and move the discussion further, in future research, we suggest the use of Gelbach’s de-
composition (Gelbach, 2016), using the specification of Cardoso et al. (2016). This method would
allow for a decomposition of the gender heterogeneity, measuring the contribution of employee,
establishment and occupational fixed effects, as well as to measure the size of the ”discrimination
component”, i.e., the unexplained part.
Our findings contribute to the discussion on flexible working arrangements, as besides its
well documented benefits in narrowing the gender wage gap (Chung and Van der Horst, 2018;
Fuller and Hirsh, 2019), we provide evidence of female inaccessibility to flexitime, using novelties
in literature. Firstly, we use a new data set covering all employees with flexible and inflexible
schedules in Portugal, which may open doors to new research. Secondly, we create a new database
with all refusals to requests for flexible working arrangements in Portugal, in 2019. Finally, this
paper contributes to the discussion on collective bargaining power and its role in reducing the
gender gap, as we find evidence of a positive impact of smaller-scale collective agreements on
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Cardoso, Ana Rute, Paulo Guimarães, and Pedro Portugal. 2016. “What drives the gender wage
gap? A look at the role of firm and job-title heterogeneity”. Oxford Economic Papers 68(2),
506–524.
Cardoso, Ana Rute and Pedro Portugal. 2005. “Contractual wages and the wage cushion under
different bargaining settings”. Journal of Labor economics 23(4), 875–902.
Chung, Heejung. 2019. “‘Women’s work penalty’in access to flexible working arrangements
across Europe”. European Journal of Industrial Relations 25(1), 23–40.
Chung, Heejung and Mariska Van der Horst. 2018. “Women’s employment patterns after child-
birth and the perceived access to and use of flexitime and teleworking”. Human relations 71(1),
47–72.
Elvira, Marta M and Ishak Saporta. 2001. “How does collective bargaining affect the gender pay
gap?”. Work and Occupations 28(4), 469–490.
Eurofound. 2016. “European Quality of Life Survey”.
Eurofound. 2017. “Work–life balance and flexible working arrangements in the European Union”.
Eurostat. 2018. “Births and fertility in 2016”.
Fuller, Sylvia and C Elizabeth Hirsh. 2019. ““Family-friendly” jobs and motherhood pay penal-
ties: The impact of flexible work arrangements across the educational spectrum”. Work and
Occupations 46(1), 3–44.
26
Gelbach, Jonah B. 2016. “When do covariates matter? And which ones, and how much?”. Journal
of Labor Economics 34(2), 509–543.
Golden, Lonnie. 2001. “Flexible work schedules: Which workers get them?”. American Behav-
ioral Scientist 44(7), 1157–1178.
Goldin, Claudia. 2014. “A grand gender convergence: Its last chapter”. American Economic
Review 104(4), 1091–1119.
Gregory, Abigail and Susan Milner. 2009. “Trade Unions and Work-life Balance: Changing Times
in France and the UK?”. British Journal of Industrial Relations 47(1), 122–146.
Hayman, Jeremy R. 2009. “Flexible work arrangements: Exploring the linkages between per-
ceived usability of flexible work schedules and work/life balance”. Community, work & fam-
ily 12(3), 327–338.
Hensvik, Lena, Ghazala Azmat, and Olof Rosenqvist. 2020. “Workplace Presenteeism, Job Sub-
stitutability and Gender Inequality”.
Kahn, Lawrence M. 2015. “Wage compression and the gender pay gap”. IZA World of Labor.
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Figure A.1. Distribution of flexible schedules, female workers and sectoral agreements per sector
Note: Data was collected from Quadros de Pessoal, covering the period from 2013 to 2018.
29
Note: Data was collected from Quadros de Pessoal, covering the period from 2013 to 2018.
Note: Data was collected from Quadros de Pessoal, covering the period from 2013 to 2018. The size of the circles
represents the weight of sectoral agreements per sector.
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Figure A.2. Evolution of refusals to requests for flexible working arrangements published by the
Commission for Equality at Work and Employment
Note: Data collected by the author.
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